

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
WESTERN DIVISION

RODNEY HARPER	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
VS.	)	No. 2:15-cv-2629-JTF-cgc
	)	
	)	
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT	)	
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, et al,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

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ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS*  
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915

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Before the Court, by way of Administrative Order 2013-05,<sup>1</sup> is a *pro se* complaint filed on September 23, 2015 by Plaintiff Rodney Harper, resident of Memphis, Tennessee, against U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Peggy R. Mastroianni, Stephanie D. Garner, Dister D. Battle, Katherine Kores, and Julianne Smith, accompanied by a motion seeking leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (Docket Entries ("D.E.") 1 & 2.)

Federal law provides that the "clerk of each district court shall require parties instituting any such civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee of \$400," 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). To ensure access to the courts, however, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) permits an indigent plaintiff to avoid payment of filing fees by filing

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<sup>1</sup> The instant case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge by Administrative Order pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639. All pretrial matters within the Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction are referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) for determination, and all other pretrial matters are referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) for report and recommendation

an *in forma pauperis* affidavit. Under that section, the Court must conduct a satisfactory inquiry into the plaintiff's ability to pay the filing fee and prosecute the lawsuit. A plaintiff seeking *in forma pauperis* standing must respond fully to the questions on the Court's *in forma pauperis* form and execute the affidavit in compliance with the certification requirements contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

In this case, the Plaintiff has submitted a properly completed and executed *in forma pauperis* affidavit. The information set forth in the affidavit satisfy Plaintiff's burden of demonstrating that they are each unable to pay the civil filing fee. Accordingly, the motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* is GRANTED.

The Clerk shall record the defendants as U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Peggy R. Mastroianni, Stephanie D. Garner, Dister D. Battle, Katherine Kores, and Julianne Smith.

Plaintiff's complaint states that he sent an appeal of a denial of records that he believes he was entitled to pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 *et seq* (also known as the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA) on or about June 19, 2015. (D.E. # 1, ¶ 7) On June 25, 2015, Plaintiff avers that he received a letter from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) stating that the office was in receipt of his appeal. (D.E. # 1, ¶ 8). Plaintiff further alleges that he has not received the records requested from the EEOC. (D.E. # 1, ¶11).

Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the defendants to disclose the requested records, a declaration that the EEOC failed to conduct a reasonable and diligent search for the records, a declaration that the defendants' failure to provide plaintiff with the documents was unlawful, and to award unspecified fees and costs to Plaintiff.

The Court is required to screen *in forma pauperis* complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action—

- (i) is frivolous or malicious;
- (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
- (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; *see also* Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).

“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally frivolous would *ipso facto* fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).

Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.

Id. at 471.

“*Pro se* complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (internal quotation marks omitted). *Pro se* litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); *see also* Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Payne v. Secretary of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming *sua sponte* dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); *cf.* Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to *pro se* litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of *pro se* litigants. Not only would that duty be

overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”), *cert. denied*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 132 S. Ct. 461 (2011).

While it appears from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff has stated a claim as to the EEOC, FOIA only applies to agencies as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) and there is no cognizable claim against any of the individuals listed as Defendants<sup>2</sup>.

Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS the action with prejudice as to Peggy R. Mastroianni, Stephanie D. Garner, Dister D. Battle, Katherine Kores, and Julianne Smith for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed as to the EEOC and that the Court order the issuance and service of process as to the EEOC only.

Signed this 9<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2015.

s/ Charmiane G. Claxton  
CHARMIANE G. CLAXTON  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**ANY OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS TO THIS REPORT MUST BE FILED WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE REPORT. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). FAILURE TO FILE SAID OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND ANY FURTHER APPEAL.**

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<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff was counseled in case no. 14-2887-JTF-cgc that FOIA only applied to agencies and not to individuals.